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Today, an instance or prospect of “cyberter-rorism” makes the news almost every week.The idea of terrorists surreptitiously hacking
into a government, military, commercial, or socially
critical computer system to introduce a virus or
worm, turn off a crucial public service, steal or alter
sensitive information,
deface or swamp a web
site, route bogus mes-
sages, or plant a Trojan
horse for future activa-
tion alarms security
personnel, spellbinds
the media, and gen-
uinely worries policymakers. Although fears that
the Y2K problem could provide opportunities to
some terrorists have not been realized, other devel-
opments since January—such as the denial-of-ser-
vice attacks against a few on-line commercial
enterprises based in the United States (Yahoo! and
eBay, among others), and speculation that software
developers secretly associated with Aum Shinrikyo
cult may have placed Trojan horses in sensitive
computer systems in Japan—continue to enliven
the threat of cyberterrorism.
Cyberterrorism thus looks like the darkest down-
side of the information revolution. It is dramatic
and it makes for quite a story. It is also a potentially
serious threat, although most instances have had
more in common with graffiti vandalism than with
bomb-tossing anarchism.
But a focus on the drama of cyberterrorism risks
overlooking the broader phenomenon of which it
is only a part: the rise of what we call “netwar.”
Cyberterrorism and terrorist netwar are not the
same thing (although at times some media conflate
the two). While some terrorists will eventually have
the technological skills or opportunities to engage
in extremely damaging cyberterrorism, this is not
the only dangerous implication of the information
revolution. More seriously, this revolution is
enabling new forms of organization and new doc-
trines that will affect the spectrum of conflict,
including terrorism. Indeed, signs are already
apparent that terrorist groups in the future will try
to gain strength and extend their reach by organiz-
ing into transnational networks and developing
swarming strategies and tactics for destroying tar-
gets, entirely apart from whether they can hack into
a target’s computer system.
REDEFINING CONFLICT
The information revolution is altering the nature
of conflict. First, the information revolution is favor-
ing and strengthening network forms of organiza-
tion, often giving them an advantage over
hierarchical forms. The rise of networks means that
power is migrating to nonstate actors, who are able
to organize into sprawling multi-organizational net-
works more readily than can traditional, hierarchi-
cal, state actors. Nonstate-actor networks are thought
to be more flexible and responsive than government
hierarchies in reacting to outside developments, and
to be better than hierarchies at using information to
improve decision making.
Second, as the information revolution deepens,
conflicts will increasingly depend on information
and communications. More than ever, conflicts will
revolve around “knowledge” and the use of “soft
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power.” Adversaries will emphasize “information
operations” and “perception management”—that is,
media-oriented measures that aim to attract rather
than coerce, and that affect how secure a society, a
military, or other actor feels about its knowledge of
itself and its adversaries. Psychological disruption
may become as important a goal as physical
destruction. Thus, major transformations are
inevitable in the nature of adversaries, in the type
of threats they may pose, and in how conflicts can
be waged. Information-age threats are likely to be
more diffused, dispersed, multidimensional, and
ambiguous than traditional threats.
In light of these changes, we see netwar emerging
as a mode of conflict and crime at societal levels,
involving measures short of traditional war in which
the protagonists use network forms of organization
and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies
attuned to the information age. These protagonists are
likely to consist of dispersed small groups that com-
municate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns




is meant to call atten-
tion to the prospect
that network-based
conflict and crime
will become major phenomena in the decades
ahead. Various actors across the spectrum of conflict
and crime are already evolving in this direction. To
give a few examples, netwar is about the Middle
East’s Hamas more than the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), Mexico’s Zapatistas more than
Cuba’s Fidelistas, and the American Christian Patriot
movement more than the Ku Klux Klan.
This spectrum includes familiar adversaries who
are modifying their structures and strategies to take
advantage of networked designs, such as transna-
tional terrorist groups, black-market proliferators
of weapons of mass destruction, transnational crime
syndicates, fundamentalist and ethnonationalist
movements, intellectual property and high-sea
pirates, and smugglers of migrants or black-market
goods. Some urban gangs, back-country militias,
and militant single-issue groups in the United States
are also developing netwar-like attributes. In addi-
tion, a new generation of radicals and activists are
just beginning to create information-age ideologies,
in which identities and loyalties may shift from the
nation-state to the transnational level of global civil
society. New kinds of actors, such as anarchistic and
nihilistic leagues of computer-hacking “cyboteurs,”
may also partake of netwar.
Many—if not most—netwar actors will be non-
state. Some may be agents of a state, but others may
try to turn states into their agents. Moreover, a net-
war actor may be both subnational and transna-
tional in scope. Odd hybrids and symbioses are
likely. Furthermore, some actors (for example, vio-
lent terrorist and criminal organizations) may
threaten United States and other nations’ interests,
but other netwar actors (for example, peaceful
social activists) may not. Some may aim at destruc-
tion, others at disruption.
The full spectrum of netwar proponents may
thus seem broad at first. But an underlying pattern
cuts across all variations: the use of network forms
of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology
attuned to the information age.
NETWAR CONFIGURATIONS
The idea of an organizational structure qualita-
tively different from traditional hierarchical designs
attracted the attention
of management theo-
rists as early as the




ing heralded as effective alternatives to bureaucracies
because of their inherent flexibility, adaptiveness, and
ability to capitalize on the talents of all their members.
What has long been emerging in the business
world is now becoming apparent in the organiza-
tional structures of netwar actors. In an archetypal
netwar, the protagonists are likely to amount to a
set of diverse, dispersed “nodes” that share a set of
ideas and interests and that are arrayed to act in a
fully internetted “all-channel” manner. 
Networks come in three basic configurations:
1) The chain network, as in a smuggling chain
where people, goods, or information move along
a line of separated contacts, and where end-to-end
communication must travel through the interme-
diate nodes; 2) the star, hub, or wheel network, as
in a franchise or a cartel structure where a set of
actors is tied to a central node or actor, and must
go through that node to communicate and coor-
dinate; and 3) the all-channel network, as in a col-
laborative network of militant small groups where
every group is connected to the other.
We expect to observe substantial differences
(and many hierarchy-network hybrids) in the spe-
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Even in information-age conflicts, real-world events
are generally more important than what happens
in the virtual world of cyberspace.
cific design choices of netwar organizations.
Often the organizational structure will incorpo-
rate various elements of the three different net-
work configurations. For example, a netwar actor
may have an all-channel council at its core, but
use stars and chains for tactical operations. Actual
network designs depend on contingent factors,
such as personalities, organizational history, oper-
ational requirements, and other influences such as
state sponsorship and ideology.1
The common feature of netwar design variants
is their lack of emphasis on formal, stable, and
vertical command and control. Networks largely
operate by consensus, which is created through
dialogue and mutual trust as opposed to bureau-
cratic fiat. In turn, mutual trust is fostered by a
strong strategic sense of shared goals and mis-
sions, along with the belief that these goals can be
attained through tactical autonomy.
Of the three network types, the all-channel has
been the most difficult to organize and sustain
historically, partly because it requires dense hori-
zontal communication and coordination. But it
has the most potential for collaborative undertak-
ings, and is the type that seems to be gaining
strength from the information revolution.
Pictorially, an all-channel netwar actor resembles
a geodesic “buckyball” (named for geodesic dome
inventor Buckminster Fuller); it does not resem-
ble a pyramid. Ideally, there is no single, central
leadership, command, or headquarters—no pre-
cise heart or head that can be targeted. The net-
work as a whole (but not necessarily each node)
has little to no hierarchy, and it may have multiple
leaders. Decision making and operations are
decentralized, allowing for local initiative and
autonomy. Thus the design may sometimes
appear acephalous (headless), and at other times
polycephalous (hydra-headed).
Since bureaucratic command and control is inher-
ently impractical in an all-channel network, the
capacity of this design for effective long-term perfor-
mance may depend on the presence of shared prin-
ciples, interests, and goals—at best, an overarching
doctrine or ideology—that spans all nodes and to
which the members wholeheartedly subscribe. Such
a set of principles, shaped through mutual consulta-
tion and consensus-building, can enable them to be
“all of one mind,” although they are dispersed and
devoted to different tasks. It can provide a central
ideational, strategic, and operational coherence that
allows for tactical decentralization. It can set bound-
aries and provide guidelines for decisions and actions
so that the members need not resort to a hierarchy—
“they know what they have to do.”2
The capacity for netwar is afforded by the latest
information and communications technologies—cel-
lular telephones, fax machines, e-mail, World Wide
Web sites, and computer conferencing. But caveats
are in order. First, the new technologies, however
enabling for organizational networking, may not be
the only crucial technologies for a netwar actor. Tra-
ditional means of communications, such as human
couriers, and mixes of old and new systems, may suf-
fice. Second, netwar is not simply a function of the
Internet; it does not take place only in cyberspace.
Netwar is not Internet war. Some key battles may
occur there, but a war’s overall conduct and outcome
will normally depend mostly on what happens in the
real world. Even in information-age conflicts, real-
world events are generally more important than what
happens in the virtual world of cyberspace.
Third, our concept of networks does not imply
that all nodes must be in constant communication,
which may not make sense for a secretive, conspir-
atorial actor. But when communication is needed,
the network’s members must be able promptly to
disseminate information as broadly as desired
within the network and to outside audiences. Last,
having access to the latest information technology
in and of itself does not make a network—such
design is made possible by the organization’s doc-
trine, structure, and strategy.
THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
A network form of organization gives distinct
advantages, both offensive and defensive, to its oper-
atives. On the offense, networks are known for being
adaptable, flexible, and versatile. This may be par-
ticularly the case where a set of actors can engage in
swarming. Little analytic attention has been given to
swarming, yet it may be a key mode of conflict in
the information age. The cutting edge for this pos-
sibility is found among netwar protagonists.
Swarming occurs when the dispersed nodes of
a network of forces converge on a target from
multiple directions. The overall aim is the sus-
tainable pulsing of force or fire. Once in motion,
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1Moreover, terrorist network nodes can be composed of a
diverse set of actors—an individual, a group, an institution,
or even a state sponsor. The nodes in a network need not be
identical in size, influence, or function.
2 The quotation is from a doctrinal statement by Louis
Beam about “leaderless resistance,” which has strongly influ-
enced right-wing white-power groups in the United States.
See Louis Beam, The Seditionist, issue 12, February 1992.
swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly
and stealthily on a target, then dissever and redis-
perse, immediately ready to recombine for a new
pulse. In other words, information-age attacks
may come in “swarms” rather than the more tra-
ditional “waves.”
In terms of defensive potential, well-constructed
networks tend to be redundant and diverse, mak-
ing them robust and resilient in the face of adver-
sity. Where they have a capacity for interoperability
and shun centralized command and control, net-
work designs can be difficult to crack and defeat as
a whole. In particular, they may defy counterlead-
ership targeting—attackers can find and confront
only portions of the network. Moreover, the denia-
bility built into a network may allow it to simply
absorb a number of attacks on distributed nodes,
leading the attacker to believe the network has been
harmed when, in fact, it remains viable, and is seek-
ing new opportunities for tactical surprise.
The difficulties of dealing with netwar actors
deepen when the lines between offense and defense
are blurred, or blended. When blurring is the case, it
may be difficult to distinguish between attacking and
defending actions, especially when an actor goes on
the offense in the name of self-defense. The blending
of offense and defense will often mix the strategic
and tactical levels of operations. For instance, guer-
rillas on the defensive strategically may go on the
offense tactically; the war of the mujahideen in
Afghanistan provides a modern example.
The blurring of offense and defense reflects
another feature of netwar: it tends to defy and cut
across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and dis-
tinctions between state and society, public and pri-
vate, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and
military, police and military, and legal and illegal.
Thus the spread of netwar increases the chal-
lenges facing the modern nation-state. Nation-state
ideals of sovereignty and authority are tradition-
ally linked to a bureaucratic rationality in which
issues and problems can be neatly divided, and
specific offices can be assigned certain tasks. In
netwar, matters are rarely so clear. A protagonist is
likely to operate in the cracks and gray areas of
society, striking where lines of authority crisscross
and the operational paradigms of politicians, offi-
cials, soldiers, police officers, and related actors
grow fuzzy and clash.
Against this background, we are led to a set of
three policy-oriented propositions about the infor-
mation revolution and its implications for netwar
and counternetwar.
Hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks
Some of the best examples of the difficulties
faced by hierarchies in fighting networks are
found in the failings of governments to defeat
transnational criminal cartels engaged in drug
smuggling, as in Colombia. The Zapatista move-
ment in Mexico, with its legions of supporters
and sympathizers among local and transnational
nongovernmental organizations, shows that
social netwar can put a democratizing autocracy
on the defensive and pressure it to continue
adopting reforms.
It takes networks to fight networks
Governments that would defend against netwar
may need to adopt organizational designs and
strategies like those of their adversaries. This does
not mean mirroring the opponent, but rather learn-
ing to draw on the same design principles of net-
work forms. These principles depend to some
extent upon technological innovation, but mainly
on a willingness to innovate organizationally and
doctrinally, and by building new mechanisms for
interagency and multijurisdictional cooperation.
Fighting networks also involves the ability not only
to neutralize critical nodes when these exist and are
identifiable (for example, key physical targets or a
group of operatives shortly before a strike), but also
to disrupt the information flows that enable dis-
persed units to coordinate their actions.
The first to master the network form will gain
major advantages
In these early decades of the information age,
adversaries who have adopted networking are enjoy-
ing an increase in power relative to state agencies.
The strategic and structural design innovations
brought by networks will give these organizations an
edge over slower state actors, whose strategies and
tactics are shaped by a traditional, hierarchical logic.
Counternetwar may thus require effective inter-
agency approaches, which by their nature involve
networked structures. The challenge will be to
blend hierarchies and networks skillfully, while
retaining enough core authority to encourage and
enforce adherence to networked processes. By cre-
ating effective hybrids, governments may better
confront the new threats and challenges now
emerging, whether generated by terrorists, militias,
criminals, or other actors.
MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM AND NETWAR
Terrorism seems to be evolving in the direction of
violent netwar. Indeed, the netwar concept is con-
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sistent with patterns and trends in the Middle East,
where the newer and more active terrorist groups
appear to be adopting decentralized, flexible net-
work structures. The rise of networked arrange-
ments in terrorist organizations is part of a wider
move away from formally organized, state-sponsored
groups to privately financed, loose networks of indi-
viduals and subgroups that may have strategic guid-
ance but enjoy tactical independence. Related to
these shifts is the fact that terrorist groups are tak-
ing advantage of information technology to coordi-
nate the activities of dispersed members.
Terrorist organizations in the Middle East have
diverse origins, ideologies, and structures, but can
be categorized roughly into traditional and new-gen-
eration groups. Traditional groups date to the late
1960s and early 1970s, and the majority were (and
some still are) formally or informally linked to the
PLO. Typically, they are also relatively bureaucratic
and maintain a nationalist or Marxist agenda. In con-
trast, most new-genera-
tion groups that arose
in the 1980s and 1990s
have more fluid organi-
zational forms, and rely
on Islam as a basis for
their radical ideology.
The traditional, more bureaucratic groups have
survived partly through support from states such
as Syria, Libya, and Iran. These groups, such as the
Abu Nidal Organization, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and three PFLP-
related splinters—the PFLP–General Command, the
Palestine Liberation Front, and the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine—retain an
ability to train and prepare for terrorist missions,
although their involvement in actual operations
has been limited in recent years, partly because of
successful counterterrorism campaigns by Israeli
and Western agencies. In contrast, the newer and
less hierarchical groups, such as Hamas, the Pales-
tinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Algeria’s Armed
Islamic Group, the Egyptian Islamic Group, and
Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network have become
the most active organizations.
The new and more active generation of Middle
Eastern groups has operated in and outside the
region. For instance, in Israel and the occupied ter-
ritories, Hamas, and to a lesser extent the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, have shown their strength over the
last five years with a series of suicide bombings that
have killed more than 100 people. Among the recent
strikes by Egypt’s Islamic Group (also known as al-
Gama’a al-Islamiya) is the 1997 attack at Luxor, in
which 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians were killed.
Another string of terrorist attacks (and foiled
attempts) has focused attention on the loosely
organized group of “Arab Afghans”—radical
Islamic fighters from several North African and
Middle Eastern countries who forged ties while
resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. One
of the leaders and founders of the Arab Afghan
movement is Osama bin Laden, a Saudi entrepre-
neur based in Afghanistan. Bin Laden allegedly
sent operatives to Yemen to bomb a hotel used by
American soldiers on their way to Somalia in 1992,
plotted to assassinate President Bill Clinton in the
Philippines in 1994 and Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in 1995, and played a role in the Riyadh
and Khobar blasts in Saudi Arabia that resulted in
the deaths of 24 Americans in 1995 and 1996.
United States officials have pointed to bin Laden as
the mastermind behind the American embassy
bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998,
which claimed the




these groups share the principles of the networked
organizations—relatively flat hierarchies, decen-
tralization and delegation of decision-making
authority, and loose lateral ties among dispersed
groups and individuals. Hamas, for example, is,
according to the United States State Department,
“loosely structured, with some elements working
clandestinely and others working openly through
mosques and social service institutions to recruit
members, raise money, organize activities, and dis-
tribute propaganda.”
Perhaps the most interesting example of terror-
ist netwar is Osama bin Laden’s Arab Afghans, who
have formed a complex network of relatively auton-
omous groups that are financed from private
sources. Bin Laden uses his wealth and organiza-
tional skills to support and direct al Qaeda (the
Base), a multinational alliance of Islamic extremists.
Most of the groups that participate in this front
(including Egypt’s Islamic Group) remain indepen-
dent, although the organizational barriers between
them are fluid (for example, there have been reports
of a recent inflow of Arab Afghans into Egypt’s
Islamic Group to reinforce the latter’s operations).
At the heart of al Qaeda is bin Laden’s own inner
core group, which sometimes conducts missions
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Terrorist netwar may also be a battle of ideas—
and to wage this form of conflict some terrorists
may want the net up, not down.
on its own. The goal of the alliance is opposition
on a global scale to perceived threats to Islam, as
indicated by bin Laden’s 1996 declaration of a holy
war against the United States and the West. In the
document, bin Laden specifies that this holy war
will be fought by irregular, light, highly mobile
forces using guerrilla tactics. Although bin Laden
finances Arab Afghan activities (exploiting a for-
tune of around $300 million, according to State
Department estimates) and directs some opera-
tions, he apparently does not play a direct com-
mand-and-control role over all operatives. Bin
Laden represents a key node in the Arab Afghan
terror network, but the network conducts many
operations without his involvement, leadership, or
financing—and will continue to be able to do so
should he be killed or captured.
From a netwar perspective, two interesting fea-
tures of bin Laden’s organization are noteworthy.
First, al Qaeda is a well-financed nonstate actor that,
lacking a firm state sponsor, cannot be easily tar-
geted by coercing supportive national governments.3
Second, bin Laden’s movement is able to relocate
operations swiftly in response to changing circum-
stances and needs. Arab Afghans associated with bin
Laden have reportedly been active in several coun-
tries, including Bangladesh, Bosnia, Chechnya, India
(Kashmir), Pakistan, Tajikistan, Somalia, and more
recently, Kosovo. Such mobility is boosted by sev-
eral local affiliates al Qaeda has in different coun-
tries, and by a sizable training establishment in
Afghanistan. The training infrastructure prepares
“Islamic rapid-deployment forces” that can be
fielded as opportunities arise.
This group’s ability to move and act quickly (and,
to some extent, to swarm) when opportunities
emerge hampers counterterrorist efforts to predict
its actions and monitor its activities. The ability of
Arab Afghan operatives to strike the American
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania—and to report-
edly consider targeting similar structures in Mada-
gascar, Gambia, Togo, Liberia, Namibia, and
Senegal—substantiates the claim that members of
this network have the mobility and speed to oper-
ate over considerable distances.
THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Another feature that distinguishes the newer
generation of terrorist groups is its adoption of
information technology. Some evidence supports
the claim that the most active groups—and there-
fore the most decentralized groups—have embraced
information technology to coordinate activities and
disseminate propaganda and ideology. At the same
time, the technical assets and know-how gained by
terrorist groups as they seek to form into multi-
organizational networks can be used for offensive
purposes: an Internet connection can be used for
both coordination and disruption. The anecdotes
provided here are consistent with the rise in the
Middle East of what has been termed “techno-
terrorism,” or the use by terrorists of satellite com-
munications, e-mail, and the World Wide Web.
The bin Laden network appears to have widely
adopted information technology. According to
reporters who visited bin Laden’s headquarters in a
remote mountainous area of Afghanistan, the ter-
rorist financier has modern computer and commu-
nications equipment. Bin Laden allegedly uses
satellite phone terminals to coordinate the activities
of the group’s dispersed operatives, and has even
devised countermeasures to ensure his safety while
using such communication systems (satellite phones
reportedly travel in separate convoys from bin
Laden’s; the Saudi financier also refrains from direct
use, and often dictates his message to an assistant,
who then relays it telephonically from a different
location). Egyptian “Afghan” computer experts are
said to have helped devise a communication net-
work that relies on the World Wide Web, e-mail,
and electronic bulletin boards so that affiliates can
exchange information without running a major risk
of being intercepted by counterterrorism officials.
Hamas also uses the Internet to share operational
information. Hamas activists in the United States use
chat rooms to plan operations and activities, and
operatives use e-mail to coordinate activities across
Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. Hamas has real-
ized that information can be passed securely over
the Internet because counterterrorism intelligence
cannot monitor accurately the flow and content of
all Internet traffic. Israeli security officials cannot
easily trace Hamas messages or decode their content.
The Internet is also used as a propaganda tool by
Hezbollah, which manages three web sites—one for
the central press office (www.hizbollah.org),
another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets
(www.moqawama.org), and a third for news and
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3Although the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is supporting
bin Laden by hosting his training infrastructure and bases,
this level of sponsorship is qualitatively different from what
Iran and Syria have traditionally offered to other Middle East-
ern terrorists. Moreover, the relationship between the Taliban
and bin Laden has often been confrontational, with the for-
mer threatening the eviction and, according to some reports,
his movements and access to communications systems.
information (www.almanar.com.lb). Hezbollah also
regularly broadcasts footage of strikes carried out
by its operatives through its television station, and
has a sophisticated media center that regularly—
and professionally—briefs foreign journalists on the
progress of its military campaign against Israel.
COERCION, WAR, OR NEW-WORLD HARBINGER?
The evolution of terrorism in the direction of
netwar will create new difficulties for counterter-
rorism. The types of challenges, and their severity,
will depend on the doctrines that terrorists develop
and employ. Some doctrinal effects will occur at the
operational level, as in the relative emphasis placed
on disruptive information operations as distinct
from destructive combat operations. However, at a
deeper level, the direction in which terrorist netwar
evolves will depend on the choices terrorists make
about the overall doctrinal paradigms that shape
their goals and strategies.
At least three terrorist paradigms should be con-
sidered: terror as coercive diplomacy; terror as war;
and terror as the harbinger of a “new world.”
These engage, in varying ways, distinct rationales
for terrorism—as a weapon of the weak, as an
assertion of identity, and as a way to break through
to a new world. While much debate has existed
about the overall success or failure of terrorism, the
paradigm under which a terrorist operates may
have a great deal to do with the likelihood of suc-
cess. Coercion, for example, implies distinctive
threats or uses of force, such as the often violent
acts carried out by Palestinians in pursuit of inde-
pendence. The norms of war often imply maxi-
mizing destruction; Osama bin Laden and his Arab
Afghan associates can be viewed within this
paradigm. The final paradigm aims at achieving the
birth of what might be called a “new world” and
may be driven by religious mania, a desire for total-
itarian control, or an impulse toward ultimate
chaos; the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo (now
renamed “Aleph”) is a recent example.
All three paradigms offer room for netwar and
allow the rise of “cybotage”—acts of disruption and
destruction against information infrastructures by
terrorists, as well as by disaffected individuals with
technical skills who are drawn into the terrorist
milieu. But terrorist netwar may also be a battle of
ideas—and to wage this form of conflict some ter-
rorists may want the net up, not down.
Many experts argue that terrorism is moving
toward ever more lethal, destructive acts. Although
this is true, it is also possible that some terrorist net-
wars will stress disruption over destruction. Net-
worked terrorists will no doubt continue to destroy
property and kill people, but their principal strategy
may move toward the nonlethal end of the spectrum,
where command-and-control nodes and vulnerable
information infrastructures provide rich sets of targets.
Indeed, terrorism has long been about “informa-
tion”—from keeping trainees for suicide bombings
away from international media, through the ways
that terrorists seek to create disasters that will make
the front pages, to the related debates about coun-
termeasures that would limit freedom of the press,
increase public surveillance and intelligence gather-
ing, and heighten security over information and
communications systems. Terrorist tactics focus
attention on the importance of information and
communications for the functioning of democratic
institutions; debates about how terrorist threats
undermine democratic practices may revolve around
freedom of information issues.
While netwar may be waged by terrorist groups
operating with any of the three paradigms, the rise
of networked groups whose objective is to wage
war may be the paradigm most relevant—and dan-
gerous—to targeted governments and their instru-
ments of power. Indeed, terrorists who perceive
themselves as warriors are already inclined to strike
enemy government and military assets.
Terrorism has a constant: finding ways to spread
fear and alarm by means of surreptitious, surgical,
asymmetrical strikes. Yet terrorism is also adaptive:
the ways chosen change with the times. In the infor-
mation age, cyberterrorism and cybotage may have
growing appeal. But so may the creation of titanic
explosions and biological or chemical disasters
whose “cyber” aspects are essentially collateral—as
in the telecommunications devices the terrorists use,
or in the impact on the media, or in the nature of
the target site (if it contains a computer switch for
financial transactions, for example).
To assess whether a particular tactic or target is a
result of netwar—or whether a netwar design may
enhance the likelihood of terrorists’ pursuing that
tactic or target—analysts should examine not only
how the information revolution is altering the tech-
nological orientations of terrorists, but also how it
is changing their organizational and doctrinal ori-
entations. This approach will require governments
to craft responses that go beyond simple technolog-
ical counters, and reengineer the way they approach
the problem of terrorism in the information age. n
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